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Till Death Do Us Part? Kirchnerism, 
Neodevelopmentalism and the Struggle 
for Hegemony in Argentina, 2003-15
Mariano Féliz
The extended Kirchnerist decade in Argentina (2003-15) is reaching 
its closure, and the political transition towards a new phase of the neo- 
developmentalist era has begun. This new phase will be earmarked 
by the heritage of Kirchnerism as a hegemonic political project and 
will reflect both the new policies introduced by it and the profound 
continuities with the neoliberal era, whose main traits were consolidated 
and perfected during this period (Féliz, 2012a). This transition occurs 
in a global and regional framework that has violently mutated in recent 
years since the beginning of the 2008 capitalist crisis in the centre, and 
the unexpected death of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez.
This chapter analyzes how the era politically dominated by Kirchnerism 
carne to mould the constitution and crisis of neodevelopmentalism in 
Argentina after the downfall of neoliberal rule. In this process, popular 
organizations struggled to push forward the organizational momentum 
that was built through clashes with neoliberalism in the late 1990S. But 
the limits of Kirchnerism as a progressive, ‘social-democratic’ movement 
became evident as it could not surpass the boundaries of dependent 
capitalism, thus becoming a farce of its own discourse of change.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we present the basis of 
neoliberal crisis and the transition into neodevelopmentalism. We then 
show how Kirchnerism became the political forcé in office and attended 
to the need to build legitimacy and hegemony. This process required the 
neutralization of the potential destabilizing effect of unfettered popular 
struggles. Third, we explain how the neodevelopmentalist project 
entered into crisis as its barriers grew and its limits became evident. 
We also analyze the way in which Kirchnerism tried to displace such 
barriers without attempting to surpass those limits. Finally,, we show 
how the crisis on neodevelopmentalism turned into a transitional crisis 
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for Kirchnerism (a crisis for its own transcendence and survival, as it 
attempted to remain in the government).
KIRCHNERISM, NEOLIBERAL HERITAGE AND THE WEAK STATE
Neoliberalism, crisis and transition
Kirchnerism was born in the explosive transition away from the con- 
vertibility plan (CP). The CP (1991-2001) was the vernacular expression 
of the Washington Consensus in Argentina and expressed the highest 
form of neoliberalism, which began as a project in Argentina in 1975 
(Féliz and Pérez, 2010). The long agony of neoliberal rule in the country 
(1998-2001) was the outcome of the ‘Menemist radicalization of the 
programme of structural reforms (1989-99), and the development of 
its contradictions to their máximum expression (Féliz, 2011).1 After 
1999 the coalition Alianza (centre-right leaning), which had won the 
presidential elections, took on the task of trying to avoid the explosión 
of increasing contradictions. This proved to be impossible (Féliz, 2011a).
This crisis developed within the regional and global framework of 
the disruption of the basis of the neoliberal project resulting from (a) 
the upsurge of popular struggles and economic and political crises in 
the peripheries; (b) the crisis tendencies in the centre (only displaced 
temporally by means of war and speculation); and (c) the progressive 
change in the axis of world hegemony towards the East (Féliz, 2011b: 
247-8). In Argentina, the violent advancement of big capitals in the 
process of transnationalization, the increase in the concentration and 
centralization of capital and the displacement of living labour in the 
process of the valorization of capital created the material substratum 
for the crisis (Féliz, 2011a). At the same time, the political recomposi- 
tion of the working classes in the country fed a cycle of social agitation 
that progressively undermined the basis for the legitimacy of the 
neoliberal programme and its state (Dinerstein, 2002). Led in struggle 
by the movement of the unemployed and factions of the organized 
labour movement, popular classes were able to erode the legitimacy of 
the neoliberal programme, leading to its final crisis in December 2001. 
The political transition included a record high vote abstention and 
blank votes in the national mid-term elections of October 2001, dozens 
of deaths by pólice repression after the 19 December 2001 popular 
uprising, the resignation of the president on 20 December and a rapid 
succession of interim presidents that would put Eduardo Duhalde in 
charge of the Executive power in early January 2002, not by popular 
vote but by decisión of Congress. Being the governor of the province 
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of Buenos Aires (the biggest, most populous province in Argentina) 
and having been Menem’s vice-president, dominant political forces, 
led by the Peronist party, saw him as someone able to bring back order 
and perform the reforms that were needed to surpass the limits of the 
neoliberal programme.
The organic crisis of neoliberalism in Argentina was superseded 
through economic adjustment and repression. On the one hand, this was 
done through a political process marked by an economic programme 
that attempted to recompose the conditions for the profitability of capital 
(Bonnet, 2006). These policies involved a huge devaluation of capital in 
every form (as variable capital, as constant capital, as financial capital, 
as productive and merchant capital etc.) and a huge transfer of income 
from labour to capital (Féliz, 2012a; Schorr, 2005). Even if shockpolicies 
were able to jump start accumulation, political stability was limited. 
Mass popular struggles continued across the country as the negative 
consequences of exiting neoliberalism were signiñcant for most of the 
population. Real wages plunged 18.1 per cent and employment fell 6 
per cent in 2002 in comparison with 2001, as 52 per cent of Argentinas 
urban population was statistically income-poor in that year (Féliz, 2015: 
75). In this context, the multiplication in the number of cash-transfer 
programmes and beneficiaries was promoted as a new policy of social 
control to attempt to satisfy immediate demands for income of millions 
of poor families while at the same time defuse the most radical political 
demands. In May 2002, the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (plan 
for unemployed heads of households, PJJHD) reached almost 2 million 
direct beneficiaries. The coerción and repression of social struggles also 
played a key role in containing social conflict, reaching their highest point 
with the assassination of the piqueteros Darío Santillán and Maximiliano 
Kosteki by pólice forces on 26 June 2002.2 These killings (and the 
reaction of popular organizations to them) became a limit to the political 
transition led by Duhalde, and gave momentum to the project designed 
to build a new political order that would reinstate the state as the repre- 
sentative of the general wilf of the people, and could, once more, revive 
capitalism as a means to attempt to achieve development in the periphery. 
Mass mobilizations by popular movements forced a government that had 
come to stay for several years to cali for early national elections in 2003. 
In the meantime, the new economic policy was beginning to be fruitful in 
terms of capital accumulation - in the third quarter of 2002 Argentinas 
economy was starting to grow again after 17 quarters of falling real gross 
domestic product (GDP) (Féliz, 2015: 74).
By chance, a little known Peronist candidate, Néstor Kirchner, won 
the presidential election in March 2003 with only 22 per cent of the 
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votes. Kirchner had been a long-running member of the Justicialist Party 
(the main formal political organization of the Peronist movement) and 
was proposed by Duhalde as its ‘successor’. In the national presidential 
elections, Kirchner carne second (as candidate of the Peronist, 
social-democratic coalition Frente Para la Victoria (Front for Victory, 
FPV), after Carlos Menem (Peronist but neoliberal) who obtained 
24.36 per cent of the votes. The party on the left spectrum with the best 
performance (Movimiento de los Trabajadores Socialistas (Movement of 
Socialist Workers, MST) gained only 1.75 per cent. However, Menem 
withdrew from the run-off second round, with the result that Kirchner 
was automatically elected, since opinión polis indicated that Kirchner 
would win with a landslide. With few initial allies in parliament and 
having won by default of its competitor, Kirchnerism as a political forcé 
in the state was born with poor original legitimacy.
Kirchnerism: making virtue out ofnecessity
Kichnerism appeared as a possible political solution to the capitalist 
governability crisis caused by the political and economic limits of neo- 
liberalism. Kirchnerism took on the task of amplifying its political base 
while at the same time looking to deactivate the more radical demands 
of the popular movements.3 This was attempted within the pre-existing 
macroeconomic framework, characterized by an expensive dollar, low 
real interest rates, wages crushed by the inflationary effects of the initial 
devaluation of the national currency and the reorientation of aggregate 
demand towards the global market (Féliz, 2015). These were the canonic 
coordinates of the macroeconomic policy of neodevelopmentalism 
(Bresser-Pereira, 2010; Curia, 2007). Kirchner’s first years were marked 
by continuities in economic policy, with Roberto Lavagna staying on 
in his post at the Ministry of the Economy, as did the president of the 
Central Bank, Alfonso Prat Gay.
Kirchner (as most political leaders within Peronism) had been an ally 
of Menem in the 1990S. However, in this new time he read the political 
situation as a period of higher levels of social conflict, a society rejecting 
the social consequences of neoliberalism, and a regional arena turning 
slightly to the left, with Chávez’s government in Venezuela in the process 
of radicalizing the Bolivarian Revolution after the oil strike of 2002-03. 
With this understanding, one that recognized a definite but limited change 
in local and regional correlation of social forces, Kirchner was able to 
create a powerful new political coalition based on factions of progressive 
organizations (such as some from the human rights movement), several 
piquetero organizations (lured in by a combination of genuine political 
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convi ction and economic cooptation), the main organizations within the 
labour movement, particularly the backbone of the Peronist movement 
the Confederación General del Trabajo (General Labour Confedera- 
tion, CGT). To be clear, Kirchnerism adopted a populist (not popular) 
strategy for it needed to recognize the organized presence of a part of the 
working people while at the same time attempting to limit their political 
autonomy (Mazzeo, 2010).
Kirchner’s government moved forward on a political programme 
that in public statements rejected neoliberalism and allowed him to win 
additional constituents. The government rolled back some of the policies 
of the 1990S, and reasserted state ownership over some of the companies 
that had been privatized, such as the Correo Argentino (Argentine postal 
service) in 2003, Aguas Argentinas (Argentine Waters, the water and 
sanitation company of Greater Buenos Aires) in 2006 and Aerolíneas 
Argentinas (Argentine Airlines, the national airline) in 2008 (Féliz, 
2014). But no signiñcant decisions were made regarding privatized 
energy, phone, trains, social security and other strategic enterprises and 
areas, at least until 2009.
With lip-service to national-popular rhetoric (some of it limited by 
symbolically important decisions, as stressed in the previous paragraph), 
taking advantage of the improving economic conditions, and having 
access to the fiscal resources of the national state (that allowed it to 
favour allies in the different provinces, local governments and organiza­
tions), Kirchnerism attacked the two main sources of possible political 
instability at the time: newyoung rank-and-file activism in trade unions 
and piquetero organizations.
In the first instance, Kichnerism looked to channel labour struggles 
within the traditional institutions of Argentinas labour legislation, in 
particular through collective bargaining. A new generation of trade unión 
activism had been born in the struggles against neoliberal adjustment, 
with wide and general demands for wage recovery, employment and 
improvement of working conditions, and willing to back up their 
demands with street struggles outside institutional regulations. Most 
of this activism was based in industrial manufacturing industries, and 
developed with the protection of the legislation that has historically 
given important autonomy to rank-and-file leadership on the shopfloor. 
Some of this new activism was tied to historical radical-left parties 
of Trotskyite tradition, in particular the Partido de los Trabajadores 
Socialistas (Socialist Workers’ Party, PTS). To confront this disruptive 
activism, collective bargaining agreements (CCA) were reactivated. 
Capitalist enterprises demanded this in an attempt to fragment and 
institutionalize the demands of the radicalized bases of organized labour 
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(Campione, 2008). This process carried on in partial and conflictive 
ways, mediated by different levels of repression and accompanied by 
other forms of intervention, such as increases in minimum wages by 
executive decree (to be included later in future collective agreements). 
The government had to rely on a combination of bureaucratic control of 
unión membership (mainly through the CGT leadership), the Ministry 
of Labour’s intervention and targeted repression of relevant conflicts 
(for example, Buenos Aires’ floating casino and the synthetic fibres 
manufacturer Mafissa in 2008, Kraft Foods in 2009 etc.). This strategy 
was successful in stealing control of the political initiative away from 
grassroots movements and allowed bureaucracies to channel demands 
within ‘rational’ boundaries (Féliz, 2012a).4 Economic expansión 
resulting from the aforementioned changes in macroeconomic policies 
and the global situation gave way to growth in employment (and falling 
unemployment) and allowed the absorption of wage increases without 
affecting the general profitability of capital (Féliz, 2015: 77). This process 
produced a progressive systemic inclusión of a significant faction of the 
new working class, even if this process included varied forms of precar- 
iousness and informality.
At the same time, Kirchnerism actively operated to contain social 
conflict led by the piquetero movement. In early 2002, Duhalde’s 
government had created the PJJHD to put down the social fire of the 
post-20 December 2001 popular uprising. The piquetero movement was 
at the time made up of three main political tendencies (Svampa and 
Pereyra, 2003). One was composed of‘autonomous’ movements inspired 
by grassroots organizing, the construction of popular power and the New 
Left (NL) experienees. A second tendeney was a grouping of movements 
mainly inspired by the national-popular tradition of Peronism. Finally, 
there was an aggregation of movements tied to radical-left parties, 
especially the other important Trotskyite organization in Argentina, the 
Partido Obrero (Workers Party, PO). This plurality of movements made 
them extremely difficult to deal with. Besides, most movements had 
been able to gain access to public resources through street struggles, thus 
gaining greater political autonomy.
President Kirchner’s government promoted the implementation of a 
new generation of social policies, the so-called ‘second generation social 
policies promoted and financed by the World Bank and the Inter-Amer- 
ican Development Bank (IADB) under the so-called ‘Basic Universalisrrí 
paradigm. These policies helped neutralize the bases of the popular 
rebellion. On the one hand, these policies operated as complements to 
increasing inclusión through the labour market. The PJJHD, born as 
a quasi-universal plan, was progressively displaced by other plans that 
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tended to emphasize the need for active requisites on the part of benefi- 
ciaries (Féliz, 2012a: 114). Some of these new programmes (such as the 
Plan Manos a la Obra (Hands-to-WorkPlan, PMO)) were used arbitrarily 
to compénsate with extra resources the more ‘complacent’ organizations, 
such as the new Movimiento Evita (Evita movement, in tribute to Eva 
Perón, historical leader of the Peronist party) that articulated the lot of 
thepiquetero organizations allied to the government. With a combination 
of ‘stick and carrot’, Kirchnerism was able to dismantle most signiñcant 
opposition to the new hegemonic project in the making.
New myth, new hegemonic project
In a favourable international and regional framework, with a successful 
combination of policies, Kirchnerism was able to rebuild the myth 
of capitalist development in the periphery. This was backed by the 
ascensión of popular left governments in Venezuela and Bolivia (with 
Cuba constituting the radical axis of the Alternativa Bolivariana para 
las Américas (Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, ALBA) and 
progressive neodevelopmentalism in Brazil, Uruguay, Ecuador and, for 
some time, Paraguay, and took advantage of favourable dynamics in 
world capitalism and the momentum of Chinas incursión into the world 
market. In such conditions, the neodevelopmentalist project in Argentina 
was able to create the material and symbolic conditions for the recon- 
struction of capitalist legitimacy without altering its foundational basis 
created through neoliberalism (Féliz, 2015): plundering of natural riches 
(extractivism) and superexploitation ofthe labour forcé, extended trans- 
nationalization of the cycle of local capital and dependency on global 
powers (USA, European Unión) and regional sub-imperialisms (Brazil, 
China). These elements, which were part of the neoliberal heritage, were 
integrated as foundations into the neodevelopmentalist project.
In its first five-year period neodevelopmentalism, in its Kirchnerist 
versión, was able to increase employment while maintaining high 
levels of work precarization (over 50 per cent of the labour forcé), 
partially recover real incomes for workers while keeping 20 per cent 
of the working population in poverty (Féliz et al., 2010) and maintain 
accelerated economic growth. This was the general dynamic of the first 
phase of the official process of growth with inclusión (the neodevelop­
mentalist versión of the neoliberal trickle-down effect).
New hegemonicproject with a new state?
In its first years, the neodevelopmentalist project, incarnated by 
Kirchnerism, was able to regain in a stable way the profit rate for big 
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capitals, opening up space for its expanded reproduction. Sustained 
expansión in accumulation allowed for the creation of a great number of 
new Jobs, albeit of a precarious nature. In parallel, the better organized 
factions of the working class were able to partially recover their real 
wages, while more informal workers as well as public employees suffered 
stagnation in their real incomes, which remained well under the average 
levels of the 1990S. Average wages grew in real terms by 4.0 per cent 
annually (7.8 per cent for registered wage-earners) between 2002 and 
2006 (Féliz, 2015: 81). Social policies, multiplied under the support of 
international credit institutions, created a network of survival that, at 
this stage, allowed the government to contain social conflict.
Kirchnerism aimed at installing the idea that in this new stage the 
state would reappear as the great peacemaker in the class struggle, as 
an actor above all class actors. In the social-democratic tradition, the 
government attempted to recreate the ever-elusive class alliance between 
labour and the local bourgeoisie. While this had already been a difficult 
bet in post-war Argentina during the first round of Peronist governments 
(1945-55), it would turn into an impossible task in the post-neolib- 
eral era (Féliz, 2012b). With no national bourgeoisie at hand, capitalist 
‘development’ can only be attempted by fostering a local bourgeoise of 
transnational tendencies.
With a political programme of bourgeoise recomposition in the 
national-popular tradition of Peronism, Kirchner’s government pushed 
the state to appear more permeable to the contradictory demands of 
the different social forces in dispute. The state was thus ‘softer’, more 
malleable to popular demands, in recognition of a correlation between 
social forces and a still fragile political equilibrium of classes. However, 
since the rules of capital had come to deeply permeate the whole realm 
of social relations, the neodevelopmentalist state was forced to limit 
emergent social conflict and popular demands within the boundaries 
of big transnational capital interests. This discourse of development as 
growth with inclusión ñnds its proper place here to develop for a while 
as it served the attempt to build a new project with hegemonic capacity, 
even if in a contradictory fashion.
FROM RECOVERY TO STAGNATION
Consolidation and first transition
The 2005 legislative elections and the 2007 presidential elections were 
tests for the ability of the government to create a sustainable hegemony 
of the power of the state. In 2005, the governing FPV obtained almost 30 
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per cent ofthe votes for the House of Deputies (HD). While improving its 
position, the FPV was still weak in terms of representation in Congress 
since it had, on its own, only 94 of 257 seats in the HD. After 2007, this 
representation went up to 153 members of a total of 257 deputies and 44 
senators of a total of 72. The left (in all its variants) had no representation.
The high point in political terms in this period was the Summit of the 
Americas in November 2005. Here, Chávez’s political initiative was key 
to bury the Alianza de Libre Comercio para las Américas (Alliance for 
Free Trade for the Americas, ALCA) project proposed by the president 
of the USA (George W. Bush). For Kirchnerism, this was the chance to 
amplify its ‘progressive’ discourse. The rejection by most Latín American 
countries of this free trade agreement was a signiñcant setback for 
US interests in the región.5 In the 2007 presidential election, Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner (Néstor Kirchner’s wife) was elected with 45 per 
cent of the vote.
From 2007 on, the political project of Kirchnerism lacked the few 
achievements in economic results that had marked the initial stage of 
recovery after the neoliberal crisis. Economic growth became more 
unstable, price inflation accelerated and began to paralyze growth in 
salaries and wages of working families and the labour market strongly 
reduced its ability to intégrate the labour forcé. There were different 
factors that contributed to this situation. On the one hand, capitalism 
in the central imperialist countries was going through a profound crisis 
of the neoliberal project. On the other hand, the South American región 
faced a combination of the loss of initiative of the countries in the ALBA 
project, deepenedby Chávez’s early death, the consolidation ofthe neode- 
velopmentalist projects (under the leadership of Brazil’s sub-imperialist 
policies) and the regional advancement of China in its inter-imperial- 
ist dispute with the USA.6 Last, but not least, internal contradictions 
particular to the neodevelopmentalist project were translating into ever 
growing barriers: high and sustained inflation, growing fiscal déficit and 
increasing foreign exchange déficit, amongst others (Féliz, 2015).
Adjustment on the move
In this context, the new government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
introduced a controlled devaluation of the nominal exchange rate and 
more explicit caps on wage negotiations (Féliz, 2014). Inflationary 
tensions led popular organizations to renew their struggles. Several 
organizations from the NL, many of them born from the piquetero 
movement, initiated in 2008 a campaign against inflation that included 
the organization of ‘popular markets’ (to sell producís at low cost, 
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without intermediaries) and the demand for the elimination of Valué 
Added Tax (VAT) on basic producís.
The neodevelopmentalist myth began to crumble as it had difficulties 
living up to the expectations it had created. The objectives of progressive 
redistribution of income and reindustrialization began to reach their 
limits. By 2006, capital’s response to higher wage demands was to 
increase inflationary pressure, actual inflation began to exceed 20 per 
cent of the annual rate. Real wages began to stagnate even for the more 
organized factions of the labour movement. The result was to bring to a 
halt the recovery in the share of labour in total income that, since 2007, 
had only marginally improved. However, while real wages stagnated and 
productivity growth picked up, the inflation rate has remained in the 
range of 20-30 per cent annually (Féliz, 2015: 81). A process of intensive 
accumulation (i.e. substantially higher investment rates and productivity 
growth) failed to succeed the easy’ accumulation based on cheap labour 
(extensive accumulation) and high export prices.
In this phase of instability, Kirchnerism decided to displace the axis 
of its hegemonic constitution. With that aim, it attempted to confront 
a bleak economic situation with a Keynesian expansión in public 
expenditures through the flexibilization of monetary policy and the 
appropriation of available sources of non-tax income. The combination 
of a wider fiscal base and changing monetary policy was an attempt 
to articúlate an expansive and compensatory economic policy in a 
framework of general contraction. The objective was to revalídate the 
growth with social inclusión in this more adverse situation. In order to 
achieve this, the government needed to do two things. First, there was 
the need to reform the function of the central bank, which was still ruled 
by 1990S legislation that did not allow for easy credit to the government. 
In late 2009, it was decided to legally allow the central bank to pay public 
foreign debt. This decisión created a political crisis in the government as 
the central bank’s president (the neoliberal Martín Redrado, appointed 
in September 2004) refused to give course to such payments. He 
eventually resigned in January 2010. Furthermore, in 2012, the reform 
of the central bank’s charter freed its hand to finance a growing fiscal 
déficit by puré monetary emission. This change would forcé the central 
bankto abandon its independent, inflation-targeting policy and make it 
more concurrent with neodevelopmentalist macroeconomic policy.
Second, the nationalization of the social security system provided the 
state with a new source of income without having to create new taxation. 
This decisión carne after the failed attempt in mid 2008 to raise taxes 
on soya exports. The mobilization of exporters and producers, which 
included roadblocks, generated a political crisis in the government with 
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the vice-president having the swing vote in Congress that rejected the 
raise. The political consequence of the crisis was the consolidation of 
a centre-right political space formed by several parties, in particular 
the traditional Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civil Unión, UCR) and 
the new business-oriented, right-wing party Propuesta Republicana 
(Republican Proposal, PRO). In the 2009 mid-term parliamentary 
election the Acuerdo Cívico y Social (Civic and Social Accord, with the 
UCR as its main party) obtained 28.9 per cent of the vote, only slightly 
below FPV’s 30.8 per cent. The coalition Unión PRO (PRO and allies) 
got 17.7 per cent.
TRANSITIONAL CRISIS OF KIRCHNERISM
IN NEODEVELOPMENTALISM
These new instruments, designed to free economic policy from some 
(not all) of the remaining restrictions from institutions of neoliberal 
origin, proved to be of little success in inducing persistent growth. They 
were unable to displace the structural limits of the economy in the midst 
of a global crisis. As the world economy began to face its first downturn 
(2007-09) in this century, the Argentinian economy was well furnished 
to take the blow and avoid signiñcant negative effects and an outright 
accumulation crisis. In 2007, international reserves topped 15.7 per cent 
of GDP (up from only 9.5 per cent in 2003), the current account ran a 
surplus of 2.8 per cent of GDP (down from 6.4 per cent in 2003) and the 
national government’s primary fiscal surplus was 3.2 per cent of GDP 
(up from 2.3 per cent in 2003). As exports (mainly commodities) began 
to fall in late 2008, industrial production stalled. The impact of the world 
crisis was reflected in falling international reserves and a signiñcant 
deterioration in the (already fragile) fiscal surplus. However, capital prof- 
itability was only slightly affected. After falling in 2008, the profit rate on 
circulating capital for big companies recovered in 2009 (Féliz, 2015: 84). 
Thus, a slight economic recovery was set in place for the period 2009-11. 
In the ñve years since 2008, average economic growth fell to half that of 
the previous stage: GDP grew only 4.8 per cent between 2008 and 2013, 
with at least two years with less than 1 per cent growth.
In spite of the political and social fragmentation of popular protest, 
the ghost of the upheaval of late 2001 remained as an influence on the 
form of the state along the entire period. For that reason, in an attempt 
to overeóme the barriers to the hegemonic project in this bleaker stage, 
Kirchnerism accentuated its national-popular discourse to build the 
means for materially overcoming the ensuing transitional crisis. If left 
unchecked, such a crisis would erode Kirchnerism’s support and forcé 
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it out of government, even if that would not necessarily mean the end 
of the neodevelopmentalist project (or the demise of Kirchnerism as a 
political forcé within the Peronist movement).
Since economic growth was lagging, the government increased the use 
of basic universalism in its policies, which included increasing pensión 
coverage for people without enough contributions, further generaliza- 
tion of cash transfer through the creation of the Asignación Universal 
por Hijo (Universal Benefit for Children) and promotion of popular 
credit (and indebtedness) to compénsate for wage stagnation. The 
government also activated an existing but mostly unused programme 
of subsidies for companies in distress called Programa de Recuperación 
Productiva (Programme of Productive Recovery, REPRO), created in 
2002 that permitted the government to subsidize the wage bilis of almost 
200,000 employees of big and médium sized corporations. This allowed 
companies to suspend workers - instead of firing them - and avoided 
a sizable political conflict. Finally, in 2009, the creation of the Plan 
Argentina Trabaja (Argentina Works Programme), consisting of about 
100,000 jobs in cooperatives financed by the government, allowed the 
government to relieve the political pressure that social organizations - 
with origins in the piquetero movement born in the 1990S - were taking 
to the streets (Féliz, 2015: 84).
This ‘populist’ radicalization was successful in amplifying Kirch- 
nerism’s support in the polis in the October 2011 elections. Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner was re-elected with 54 per cent of the votes. 
At the time, a change in electoral law had created compulsory and 
simultaneous primaries for all political parties (PASO), and had set a 
mínimum of 2 per cent of total voters required for any party to be able to 
go on to the official election. This promoted the constitution of a radical 
left electoral front (Frente de Izquierda y de los Trabajadores (Front of 
the Left and Workers, FIT) from three Trotskyite parties (PO, PTS and 
Izquierda Socialista or Socialist Left, IS). They obtained only 2.3 per cent 
of the popular vote.
With the support of more than 50 per cent of the electorate, Cristina 
Fernández’s last government found Kirchnerism confronting the systemic 
need to push forth the capitalist radicalization of the hegemonic project 
through devaluation, fiscal and external adjustment, with the aim of 
overcoming its barriers (inflation, stagnation in production, employment 
and wages, fiscal and foreign déficits etc.). This decisión expressed its 
desire to search for its continuity in power for the management of the 
state. In October 2010, the unexpected death of Néstor Kirchner gave 
a blow to Kirchnerism’s intentions of him coming back as presidential 
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candidate in 2011 or in 2015 (after Cristina Fernández’s last constitu- 
tional re-election).
The transition began in late 2011 (right after Cristina Fernández’s 
re-election) with a heterodox adjustment policy, dubbed ‘fine tuning’ 
by the government. This new policy was marked by tighter controls of 
foreign currency markets. In late 2013, the newpolicies were consolidated 
by naming a new Minister of the Economy (the Keynesian Axel Kiciloff). 
A signiñcant devaluation of the peso in early 2014, a progressive return 
to international financial markets, the amplification of the policies of 
popular credit for consumption and the strengthening of the strategy 
of implicit wage ceilings were the key tools in the new strategy. These 
instruments were used to try to adjust the macroeconomic disequilibria 
that were most evident and risky for the continuity of the neodevelop- 
mentalist strategy (e.g. increasing foreign déficit and loss of productive 
activity) and in the development of an ‘in the médium run programme 
that would consolídate the structural bases of the hegemonic project. 
Due to this ‘fine tuning’ of economic policy, in 2014 for the first 
time in more than a decade real wages fell and so did, consequently, 
popular consumption.
Increasing fragmentation of the labour movement and growing 
uneasiness amongst the working people and popular organizations 
marked this new period. The two main labour organizations were divided 
into factions more or less distant from the government. In 2008 the CGT 
became divided in three ways, in 2010 the Central de los Trabajadores 
Argentinos (Argentine Workers Central Unión, CTA, born in the mid 
1990S and constituted mainly by state employees and teachers) was also 
formally divided. After many years, factions of the CGT and the CTA 
prepared a general strike for November 2012, several more strikes would 
come in the next few years. They would have disparate participation and 
political impact. Kirchnerism’s political control was tested in this final 
stage since economic stagnation, instability and systematic deterioration 
of the living conditions of the population were fracturing its political 
coalition and base. This expressed the weakening of the hegemonic 
capability of neodevelopmentalism as a project of the dominant classes, 
and that of Kirchnerism as a privileged political actor that warrants 
its continuation.
Popular sectors are still lacking political alternatives that they 
recognize as their own and seem to keep betting for the ‘lesser evil’ 
that is, paradoxically, always the worst since it promotes the adaptation 
towards a historically regressive movement (Gramsci, 1999) and it 
negates the need to build real radical political alternatives and tends to 
support reformist options within capitalism (such as Kirchnerism). The 
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promising electoral front of the anti-capitalist left around the FIT has not 
become an option for the masses of people in the field of elections. In the 
recent 2015 presidential elections, the FIT received only 3.27 per cent. 
With its limits, this convergence seems to be part of an ‘in the médium 
rurí political alternative for radical transformation, to build a political 
unity in the diversity of practices and traditions that can recover the best 
of popular good sense’ (to paraphrase Gramsci) as part of a wide strategy 
for the construction of popular power. In fact, many popular organiza- 
tions promoted and campaigned for FIT, even if not formally being part 
of it.7
The new economic policy puts Kirchnerism into crisis (since it 
needs to find ways to present itself as a dominant political forcé) and 
the radicalization (capitalist intensification, if you will) of neodevelop- 
mentalism increases the alienation of its social bases, fragmenting class 
actors and political forces. The forces of succession within the ‘parties 
of order’ (to paraphrase Marx in the i8th Brumaire) are being set in 
a context quite unlike the one that gave birth to Kirchnerism in 2003. 
With an organic crisis in the making, the newly elected government of 
Mauricio Macri, candidate of the right-wing coalition Cambiemos (Let’s 
Change) that was constituted for the 2015 elections, will deepen the 
tendencies to adjustment of the several disequilibria and limits facing 
the neodevelopmentalist project with the intent to recover the mac- 
roeconomic conditions for expansión within this project.8 This will 
inelude acceleration of the devaluation of the local currency, reduction 
of the fiscal déficit and increasing indebtedness in global markets. The 
new government will confront the working people while they are in a 
situation of political disarray, which will be one of Kirchnerism’s most 
important heritages. Only if the people and their organizations can 
recover the ghost and experience of the 2001 popular uprising will we 
be in a condition to confront the future with the chance of making it 
our own.
NOTES
1. Carlos Menem was elected president in 1989. He was a prominent member 
of the Peronist movement, a political movement characterized for its labour 
origins but also its pragmatism. Menem was elected on a developmentalist 
platform but as soon as he took office he embraced a neoliberal programme. 
Most of the elected members of the Peronist movement at the time defended 
this right-wing swing.
2. Piquetero is the denomination of a way of popular struggle that implies the 
use of roadblocks (.piquetes) as an important means of direct action, especially 
for movements of unemployed people (Dinerstein, 2002). Piqueteros are 
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those people participating in such actions. Darío Santillán and Maximiliano 
Kosteki were members of the Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupad. These 
demands could be summed up in the expression Trabajo, Dignidad y Cambio 
Social (‘Work, Dignity and Social Change’, which at the time meant ‘socialist’ 
change) and Que se vayan todos (‘They all must go’, in the understanding 
that the political elite was to be ousted).dos Aníbal Verán (movement of 
unemployed workers, MTD).
3. These demands could be summed up in the expression Trabajo, Dignidad y 
Cambio Social (‘Work, Dignity and Social Change’, which at the time meant 
‘socialist’ change) and Que se vayan todos (‘They all must go’, in the under­
standing that the political elite was to be ousted).
4. This does not mean that unión leaders did not ‘win’ beneñts for their 
constituency. However, their need for control over potential competitors 
within their unions led them to fight against more radical struggles.
5. The ALCA project would deepen Argentinas economic dependency, as 
it would promote imports from the USA and enhance the production 
of primary products for exports. Its rejection, however, didn’t prevent 
Argentinas economy from increasing its dependent pattern of association 
in the world market through growing asymmetric relations with Brazil and 
China, amongst other economic spaces.
6. China still operates as a sub-imperialist power but it is increasingly becoming 
a neo-imperialist one.
7. While in social terms, the political forces from the left have signiñcant 
weight through territorial organizations, unions etc. (although not dominant 
presence), they still lack sufficient electoral influence. There is much to work 
out in terms ofunity and the abilityto gain majority support ofthepopulation. 
But, as the writer Andrés Rivera says, ‘revolution is an eternal dream’.
8. As we were closing this chapter, on 23 November 2015 the PRO candidate, 
Mauricio Macri, had won the presidency in the 2nd round against the 
Kirchnerist candidate Daniel Scioli, by a slim margin of 51.4 per cent against 
48.6 per cent.
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